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ABSTRACT 
A key argument of the globalisation thesis’s sceptics, such as Linda Weiss and Hirst 
and Thompson, is that most Third World countries remain marginal to the international 
economy in terms of both investment and trade. The sceptics’ argument is supported by 
empirical evidence on foreign direct investment (FDI) and trade flows, which are 
presented in terms of US dollars. In this paper we re-examine the empirical evidence on 
international investment drawing on the concept of labour commanded, central to 
Classical Political Economy. Using data on exchange rates and wage rates (or labour 
costs), combined with that on dollar values of FDI, we remap the patterns of global 
capital flows in terms of the quantities of labour which such investment can mobilise. 
On this basis we draw a very different conclusion from the sceptics. In a nutshell, our 
conclusion is the following: developing countries are far more integrated into the global 
economy than the FDI data suggests, as a result of the amount of labour that can be 
commanded with the absolute levels of FDI, itself due to low wages. 
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Globalisation? No Question: 
Foreign Direct Investment  
and Labour Commanded1 
1. Introduction 
Over the last few decades, the number of different definitions of ‘globalisation’ has 
mushroomed, together with their associated explanations and rationalisations. This vast 
literature is divided across academic/intellectual disciplines and the partialities inherent 
in each disciplinary framework have led to different conceptualisations of 
‘globalisation’, regarding it as principally economic, social, political or cultural, for 
example. Held, et al. (1999: 2–10) propose a useful classification of approaches towards 
the study of the phenomenon, distinguishing sceptical, transformationalist and 
hyperglobalist theses. Following this classification, Hoogvelt (2001: 120) suggests that 
‘these approaches correspond [respectively] to whether one views globalization as 
primarily an economic, a social or a political phenomenon.’ 
The sceptics, whose argument we will critically discuss in this paper, adopt a primarily 
economic perspective. They question the relevance of notions such as globalisation to 
describe global trends in foreign direct investment (FDI) and trade in the last quarter-
century. In contrast, the transformationalists regard the process of globalisation as 
‘primarily a social phenomenon that has brought qualitative changes in all cross-border 
transactions’ (Hoogvelt 2001: 120). The phenomenon in question is what David Harvey 
(1989) has called ‘time-space compression’ and its emergence can be seen in the fusion 
between information and telecommunication technology, as well as in the reduction in 
transport costs (Dicken 2002). These two factors have combined to bring the 
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‘annihilation of space through time’. They have thus created a ‘new economy’ based on 
networks, and a consequent transformation of cross-border activities, which is then 
called globalisation (Castells 1996). 
Finally, the hyperglobalists tend to emphasise power and politics. Their focus is the 
nation state, the relevance of which is problematised in the context of global trends. 
Here the thesis advanced (see, for example, Strange, 1996) is the declinist view of the 
state. Comparing the power of business and transnational production networks, on the 
one hand, with that of nation-states, on the other, these authors conclude that the former 
is growing relative to the latter. A common illustration of this approach is the ranking of 
TNC and government powers, as measured by their net revenue. Such a ranking 
positions companies such Ford, Texaco and GM above Brazil and other poorer states 
(see Sklair, 2002). The declinist thesis is that nation states have lost power over their 
own economies and instead are simple ‘transmitters of global market discipline to the 
domestic market’ (Hoogvelt 2001: 120). 
Our modest aim in this paper is to problematise the sceptics’ thesis from a critical 
political economy perspective. By doing this we open up the ‘economic’ point of view 
to “contamination” with issues of power and qualitative change, which are of relevance 
to other discussions of globalisation. It must be clear that our purpose here is not the 
discussion of this “contamination”, but rather the proposal of an entry point to this 
discussion.2 This entry point is the discoursive problematisation of the empirical 
evidence on foreign direct investment (FDI) that the sceptics provide in support of their 
argument. FDI is defined in terms of some monetary unit, such as US dollars. Following 
an old tradition of radical political economy, we argue that this monetary definition 
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conceals underlying social relations; in fact, money is a social relation, yet it appears to 
us as a thing. Here we propose an alternative measure, one that can make help to make 
more visible these social relations and can therefore open to account for their critical 
problematisation. Drawing on classical political economy’s category of labour 
commanded, we thus define the new variable Labour Commanded FDI.3 To our 
knowledge, neither the large empirical current literature on FDI nor the current 
theoretical-historical literature on labour commanded has opened to the question of 
power in the way we propose. 4 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we first outline the sceptics’ 
criticisms of the globalisation thesis, before suggesting some problems with this 
economic approach. In section 3, we discuss the theoretical foundations of the concept 
of labour commanded, which are to be found in the work of Adam Smith, David 
Ricardo and Karl Marx. The paper’s quantitative heart is section 4. Here we explain 
how we transform the empirical evidence on FDI, cited by the sceptics in support of 
their arguments, into a measure of labour commanded and present results. These results 
show that, far from being marginal to the global economy, in terms of quantity of labour 
commanded, developing countries are, in fact, highly integrated into it. We conclude, in 
section 5, by countering anticipated criticisms of our methodology and suggesting 
directions for future research. 
 
2. Globalisation and its sceptics 
According to sceptics of the globalisation thesis, such as Hirst and Thompson (1999), 
Linda Weiss (1997, 1998) and David Gordon (1998), the extent of globalisation, and in 
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particular its novelty, have been grossly overstated. Hirst and Thompson claim even that 
they are ‘convinced that globalization, as conceived by the more extreme globalizers, is 
largely a myth’ (1999: 2). To make their argument, the sceptics have charted 
quantitative historical comparisons of foreign trade and capital movements and have 
concluded that globalisation, as a worldwide integration of national economies, is 
nothing new. In fact, taking proxy measures of integration, such as share of foreign 
direct investments over production or incidence of trade in national economies, they 
suggest the world is less integrated now than it was in the early part of the nineteenth 
century. 
Thus, for example, Glyn and Sutcliffe write: 
The system has ... become more integrated or globalized in many respects. ... Nevertheless what has 
resulted is still very far from a globally integrated economy. ... In short, the world economy is 
considerably more globalized than 50 years ago; but much less so than is theoretically possible. In 
many ways it is less globalized than 100 years ago. The widespread view that the present degree of 
globalization is in some way new and unprecedented is, therefore, false. (Glyn and Sutcliffe 1992: 91, 
cited in Dicken 2003: 11) 
Hirst and Thompson reach a similar conclusion. Examining post-war investment and 
trade flows, they find that ‘between 54 per cent and 70 per cent of the world’s 
population was in receipt of only 16 per cent of global FDI flows in the first half of the 
1990s. In other words, between a half and two-thirds of the world was still virtually 
written off the map as far as any benefit from this form of investment was concerned’ 
(Hirst and Thompson 1999: 74). Kleinknecht and ter Wengel, focusing on the EU, find 
that ‘to the extent that trade [and FDI] exceeds the frontiers of the European Union, the 
lion’s share of transaction still takes place among the rich OECD countries, notably 
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with the US. Looking at long-run trade figures, one can also question the proposition 
that we are currently experiencing an historically unique stage of internationalisation’ 
(1998: 638).  
In the sceptics’ approach, then, globalisation as global integration is put under question 
or even treated as a ‘myth’ because the bulk of FDI and trade are concentrated in the 
‘triad’ of North America, Europe and Japan, the dominant economic blocs. However, 
there are several broad problems with this solely economic approach to globalisation. 
Here we focus on one them, that of measure.  
The problematic of measure permeates almost every issue of interest to (political) 
economists. Regarding globalisation, if this phenomenon is understood as one of the 
integration of people and livelihoods across the globe, then to what extent do patterns of 
FDI (and trade) flows measure it? To what extent does a knowledge of trade and 
investment quantities give insights into the mutual relations between, a mother’s work 
of reproduction in Indonesia, say, and a steel worker’s work of production in Indiana, 
USA or a call-centre worker’s service labour in India? It is not just that there is no 
monetary measurement for mothers feeding children, there is no market value attributed 
to this work at all.5 But despite the lack of measurement of such work, patterns of 
capital investments cannot be theorised independently of it, that is, independently of 
differentials in the conditions of reproduction, much of it unwaged, of labour-power in 
different localities.6 Hence, and perhaps paradoxically, capital movement does in a sense 
measure the relative conditions of the reproduction of labour power and for the 
accumulation of capital more generally. That is, capital flows provide an index of an 
amalgam of wage rates differentials, degree of revolts and insubordinations, degrees of 
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normalisation to markets, extent of state public spending on entitlements and public 
services and so on. For, if we assume that capital flows to those locations where it can 
find workers who are healthy, sufficiently willing and hardworking, appropriately 
skilled and where, moreover, wage rates (and labour costs in general) are sufficiently 
low, then the fact that capital does (or does not) flow into a particular location indicate 
that these conditions do (or do not) exist 
What is the implication of all this for our critique of the economic view of 
globalisation? The implication is that monetary measures for us matter more as a 
moment in a process (indeed, a contradictory process based on conflict and on the 
articulation between monetised production and non monetised reproduction) than a 
static picture of a ‘structure’. For this reason, to argue, as the sceptics do, that trade and 
FDI are concentrated in the triad, does not in fact question globalisation as process of 
capitalist integration. On the contrary, this empirical evidence perhaps reveals the 
capitalist character of this process of integration, one based on the command over 
labour and its differentiation along a continual reconfiguring international division of 
labour. Given the miserable wages of the global South in relation to those paid in the 
Northern developed countries, and the overall lower value of labour power in these 
countries, the fact that only 15 or 20 per cent of world FDI flows into the South may 
demonstrate, not that global investment is unfairly distributed, but rather that it is fairly 
distributed, according its capacity to command labour within the process of capitalist 
accumulation.  
For example, in the United States, $20 will employ one worker for one hour, that is, it 
will command just a single hour of labour time. But, in China or Thailand, $20 can put 
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four people to work each for ten hours, whilst in India that $20 is sufficient to put ten 
people to work, each for ten hours. When the difference that $20 makes is between 
commanding one hour of labour time, on the one hand, and commanding 40 hours or 
100 hours, on the other, it matters much less that less FDI goes to the South. This is the 
problematic introduced by what classical political economy calls labour commanded. 
 
3. Theoretical foundations of labour commanded (Smith, Ricardo, Marx) 
As is well-known, Adam Smith introduced the notion of labour commanded in one of 
two theories of value. In his first, ‘labour-embodied’ theory, a commodity’s value is 
determined by the labour time materialised, or embodied, in it, that is, the quantity of 
labour necessary to produce it. In the second, ‘labour-commanded’ theory, the 
commodity’s value depends on the labour it can itself command. Now these two 
definitions of value are in contradiction as the former (embodied or materialised labour) is 
independent from the value of labour (wages), while the latter depends on the value of 
labour. According to Smith, materialised labour was true in  
the early and rude state of society which preceded both the accumulation of stock and the 
appropriation of land, the proportion between the quantities of labour necessary for acquiring different 
objects seems to be the only circumstance which can afford any rule for exchanging them for one 
another. (Smith 1970: 150) 
This condition is altered ‘as soon as stock has accumulated in the hands of particular 
persons’ (Smith 1970: 151). That is, as soon as private property is introduced, ‘something 
must be given for the profits of the undertaker of the work who hazards his stock in this 
adventure’ (ibid: 151). Further, as soon as land becomes private property, ‘the landlords, 
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like all other men, love to reap where they never sowed, and demand a rent even for its 
natural produce’ (ibid: 152).  
Thus, in the ‘civilised’ state of society, the value of a commodity resolves into labour 
commanded: 
The value of any commodity … to the person who possesses it, and who means not to use or consume 
it himself, but to exchange it for other commodities, is equal to the quantity of labour which it enables 
him to purchase or command. Labour, therefore, is the real measure of the exchangeable value of all 
commodities. (Smith 1970: 133) 
Ricardo advances two interlinked objections to Smith’s theory of labour commanded. 
First, Smith’s notion of labour commanded depends on the value of ‘labour’. But the value 
of ‘labour’ depends in turn on the value of those commodities constituting workers’ 
subsistence. Thus, we go round in circles. Second, suppose the labour required to produce 
a given quantity of food doubles. ‘[Y]et, the labourer’s reward may possibly be very little 
diminished.’(Ricardo 1951: 15) This is because Ricardo assumes subsistence-level wages. 
Thus, if we measure the value of that quantity of food in terms of labour embodied, value 
has doubled. But if we measure that same quantity of food in terms of the labour for which 
it will exchange, than value has remained constant (the same amount of food sets in motion 
the same amount of labour). For this reason, Ricardo proposes his own version of the 
labour embodied theory of value: 
The value of a commodity, or the quantity of any other commodity for which it will exchange, 
depends on the relative quantity of labour which is necessary for its production, and not on the greater 
or less compensation which is paid for that labour (Ricardo 1951: 11). 
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Marx also rejects Smith’s theory of labour commanded, as a theory of value. Instead, he 
founds his value theory, not on the quantity of actual (concrete) labour embodied in an 
individual commodity, but rather on the quantity of (abstract) labour socially necessary to 
produce it. Marx’s critique recognises that labour time does not stop being the immanent 
measure of value ‘from the moment when the conditions of labour confront the wage-
labourer in the form of landed property and capital’ (Marx 1969: 73). Rather, it is the 
‘expressions “quantity of labour” and “value of labour” [that] are not identical’ and 
therefore the value of commodity ‘although determined by the labour-time contained in 
them, is not determined by the value of labour’ (ibid: 73) 
If labour commanded is not for Marx the immanent measure of value, it gives us another 
important indication, and he qualifies Smith’s view in its role:  
When [Smith] comes to the exchange between materialized labour and living labour, between 
capitalist and workers, and then stresses that the value of the commodity is now no longer determined 
by the quantity of labour it itself contains, but by the quantity … of living labour of others which it can 
command … he is not in fact saying by this that commodities themselves no longer exchange in 
proportion to the labour-time they contain; but that the increase of wealth, the increase of the value 
contained in the commodity, and the extent of this increase, depends upon the greater or less quantity 
of living labour which the materialised labour sets in motion. And put in this way it is correct (Marx 
1969: 77). 
Surprisingly, this acknowledgement of ‘something deeper’ (ibid: 71) in Smith’s 
argument has generally been overlook by the extensive exegetic literature of Marx’s 
theory of value. If the value of labour-power is not an indication of the value of 
commodities, it is certainly an important factor in determining the amount of living 
labour that can be put to work by a given quantity of capital. It can therefore provide us 
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with an idea of the ‘increase in wealth’ (in value terms) that a certain quantity of capital 
(still in value terms) can potentially generate, through setting living labour in motion.  
This meaning, in which Marx refers to labour-commanded as that quantity of living 
labour which is set in motion by a given amount of capital, is also evident in other 
contexts of his writing (see, for example, Marx 1981: 323). There is however another 
sense in which we can gain insight by the term labour commanded. This is the potential 
living labour that can be put in motion by a certain money-value of capital. This 
understanding, in fact, relates back to Hobbes’ insight that wealth is power and to 
Smith, who also links labour commanded with power. This power consists precisely of 
that ‘command over all the labour’ (Smith 1970: 134). Marx, in turn, argues that, 
The power which each individual exercises over the activity of others or over social wealth exists in 
him as the owner of exchange value, of money. The individual carries his social power … in his 
pocket. (Marx 1973: 156–57) 
This conception of labour-commanded stresses the power of money to control others’ 
time, to put people to work, to command labour, whether or not this power is actually 
exercised. Indeed, the command over labour and the exercise of this command, refer to 
two different concepts within Marx’s theory of value and surplus-value, which is based 
on the distinction between labour and labour power. The former is not a commodity, but a 
life-activity creating value. The latter is a commodity to be exchanged on the market and 
has a price like any other commodity. Labour commanded therefore is not yet a measure of 
labour expended, although it gives us an indication of the amount of labour that can be 
expended, that can potentially be set in motion.7  
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Changes in quantities of labour commanded therefore, as reflected in changes in monetary 
FDI patterns translated into labour commanded, for example, do not give us an indication 
of labour actually expended or embodied; rather, they point to changes in the quantity of 
waged labour that can potentially be set in motion within the accumulation process. 
However, this quantity is also dependent upon the level of wages, which in turn depends 
upon general conditions of labour-power reproduction. Thus, in this context, the notion of 
labour commanded opens up the problematisation of a variety of factors, including 
relations between classes and between waged and unwaged sections of the working class, 
which the simple monetary measures of FDI disguise. This problematisation is of course 
beyond the scope of this paper.8  
 
 
Our effort here is  . that a similar concept to the problematicemerging from  a discussion of 
more recent use of the comparing of It is perhaps important to point out at that the 
emphasis on the potential character of  labour set in motion by quantity of money is a 
different problematic than the one of finding a measure to  
 
(Amado 2003) Adri ana More i ra Amado 
To summarise this section, there are two ways in which we can conceive of labour-
commanded: first, as a measure of value (for Smith) or increase in value, that is, of 
surplus value (for Marx); second, as a measure of the (possibly potential) quantity of 
living labour which can be set in motion by a quantity of money as capital. It is the 
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second meaning which is of interest to us in this paper. By converting statistics on 
foreign direct investment and trade from money terms into terms of labour commanded, 
we can gain insights of the increase in control over wealth, understood in terms of 
labour time that can potentially be set in motion by a given quantum of money, which 
results from these indicators of economic globalisation. In short, the question of the 
extent to which global capital is inserting itself into people’s lives cannot be answered 
by considering only absolute quantities of money. Instead, we must examine also the 
potential labour (life) time that these quantities can set in motion in different contexts. 
We turn to this task in the next section. 
 
4. Foreign direct investment and labour commanded 
4.1. Method 
Given monetary flows of foreign direct investment, valued in US dollars, we obtain 
figures for annual labour commanded by dividing these FDI inflow figures by US dollar 
values of hourly wage rates in manufacturing. That is, the number of hours of labour 
commanded in country i in year t by foreign direct investment inflows, lcit, is given by, 
itit
it
it
we
FDI
=lc ,  
where FDIit is annual FDI inflow (in US dollars) into country i in year t, eit is the 
exchange rate against US dollars and wit is the hourly labour cost in local currency.9 
We then sum across developed and developing countries to obtain aggregate annual 
figures: 
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 ∑
ed)i(D'
itted,D' lc=LC ,  
∑
ing)i(D'
itting,D' lc=LC . 
We follow the United Nations’ conventions regarding definitions of ‘developed’ and 
‘developing’ countries.10 We then select the top 20 developed-country and top 20 
developing-country recipients of FDI over the period 1970–2002. These countries are, 
in descending order: 
Developed: United States, United Kingdom, Belgium-Luxembourg,11 France, Federal 
Republic of Germany, Netherlands, Canada, Spain, Australia, Italy, Ireland, Denmark, 
Japan, Switzerland, Austria, Finland, Norway, Portugal, New Zealand. 
Developing: China, Hong Kong, Brazil, Mexico, Singapore, Argentina, Malaysia, Chile, 
Thailand, India, Colombia, Taiwan, Peru, South Africa, Philippines, Indonesia, 
Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Democratic Republic of Korea. 
4.2 Results 
Aggregate FDI inflow figures for each of these two groups of countries are plotted in 
figure 1.12 Also plotted in figure 1 are total FDI inflows into developed countries, into 
developing countries and globally. It is clear from this figure that the 20 developed 
countries selected receive the lion’s share of all FDI inflows into developed countries 
(more than 90 percent in every year and 96 percent on average). The selected 
developing countries account for at least 50 percent of all FDI inflows into developing 
countries in all but two years (1975 and 1982) and 78 percent on average.  
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FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
We can observe from figure 1, the empirical basis for sceptics’ critique of the 
globalisation thesis.13 Over the three decades, FDI inflows into developed countries 
have dwarfed those into developing countries, averaging, respectively, 73 percent and 
27 percent of total flows.  
The data is presented slightly differently in figure 2, in which we aggregate FDI flows 
over sub-periods. The story is the same however: FDI has grown exponentially over the 
three decades, but inflows into developed countries dominate those into developing. 
In figure 3 we present results for our new labour commanded FDI variable for the 
selected countries.14 It is clear here that the sceptics’ interpretation of globalisation is 
completely reversed. In terms of labour commanded FDI, the lion’s share now ‘belongs’ 
to developing countries. This is even clearer in figure 4. When we measure capitalist 
investment in terms of its potential to mobilise labour, i.e., in terms of the social power 
of money, there would seem to be no doubt: capital’s pervasive globalisation across the 
globe can also be made intelligible quantitatively. As far as capital in concerned 
therefore, there is no need for greater investment in the South in relation to the North: it 
is already able to command masses of living labour there, and this it is able to so by 
paying pitiful wages. 
FIGURES 3 AND 4 ABOUT HERE 
We should stress here that none of the figures presented here should be treated as exact. 
First, we have drawn on data for labour costs or wages in manufacturing only, since this 
is far more readily available than economy-wide figures. Second, for many countries 
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complete data on hourly labour cost is not available; for these countries hourly figures 
were estimated by also utilising working-hours series, which themselves are frequently 
incomplete; labour costs themselves sometimes had to be extrapolated or estimated 
from earnings or wage series.15 Finally, the figures published by the various bodies (the 
US BLS, the ILO and the UN) are themselves likely to be subject to errors and not 
always directly comparable, given that sources, coverage, sample sizes and so on, vary 
from country to country. However, these figures do present a broad-brush overview, 
which illustrates general trends in FDI-labour-commanded and comparisons between 
developed and developing economies.  
We can also note that the figures are likely to under-estimate quantities of labour 
commanded in developing countries vis-a-vis developed countries for two reasons. 
First, as discussed in section 4, above, the 20 selected developed countries received on 
average 96 per cent of all FDI inflows (in dollar terms) into developed countries, whilst 
the corresponding figure for the 20 developing countries is 78 per cent. To obtain a 
more accurate reflection of FDI labour commanded in developing countries as a whole 
then, the figures presented here should perhaps be inflated by a factor of perhaps 25 to 
30 per cent.16 In contrast, the figures for developed countries need only be inflated by 5 
per cent. Second, as noted in the Appendix, below, for many countries and years, labour 
costs are estimated from figures for earnings or wages. But, because of higher rates of 
business taxation, more stringent laws regulating workplace health and safety, as well as 
working condition more generally being more favourable to workers, the ratio of labour 
costs to earnings will tend to be higher for developed countries than it is for developing. 
The estimation algorithm does not take this into account, however; thus, developing-
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country labour-costs estimates are likely to be biased upwards and labour-commanded 
estimates will be biased downwards. 
We should also emphasise that the concept of labour commanded refers to the potential 
labour (life) time that can be put to work. It is of secondary importance whether a 
particular quantum of money capital is actually advanced to employ people, rather than 
invested in fixed capital, or used to transfer ownership of existing productive assets, 
say. Thus, the objections of, for example, Weiss (1997, 1998) that a high proportion of 
FDI is either directed towards ‘non-productive’ assets or is concentrated on merger and 
acquisition (M&A) activity do not invalidate our argument.17 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper we have begun to explore the classical idea of labour commanded in its 
application to modern processes of globalisation. In this preliminary work, we have 
suggested that monetary measures of global FDI trends, when translated into terms of 
labour commanded, can reveal results which are quite the opposite of those cited by 
economic critics of the globalisation thesis. In fact, according to our estimates of labour 
commanded, the populations of the global South (developing countries) are ‘benefiting’ 
from this form of investment far more even than populations in the North, and are 
certainly far from being ‘virtually written of the map’, as Hirst and Thompson suggest. 
The approach we have adopted here allows us to problematise the notion, which is held 
dear by conventional economic wisdom and embedded in economic discourse, that 
investment is uniquely associated with a ‘benefit’ to the recipient local population. In 
fact, a large quantity of labour-commanded FDI could well be associated with poorly 
performing social and environmental indicators, which results in a high level of labour 
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commanded per dollar. As one example of the double-edged nature of investment, one 
could reflect on the investment programme to build a series of dams along the Narmada 
river and its tributaries in central India. This investment can certainly be seen to 
‘benefit’ local unemployed labourers and engineers, but hardly those thousands of 
families who have to be displaced to make room for the development. High 
displacement rates and, in general, the high vulnerability of the local population would 
be reflected in prevailing wage rates through something akin to Marxian theory of the 
reserve army of labour (Marx, 1976).18 The monetary figures of FDI are not able to 
capture the social costs associated with investment programmes. In contrast, labour 
commanded FDI figures, through their emphasis on power and their link to conditions 
of reproduction captured by the prevailing wage rate, are better able to reflect such 
issues.  
This methodology thus provides thus a framework within which other questions on 
power can be posed and we conclude by suggesting a few such possible studies. In the 
first place, the same approach can be applied to trade figures, which we anticipate could 
be revealing of patterns of global integration along the lines we have defined in this 
paper. If relatively small amounts of FDI in developing countries become relatively 
large amounts of labour commanded FDI, so the same would apply for the relatively 
small monetary figures of global trade when measured in hours of labour commanded.19  
Second, for accounting convenience, our analysis has aggregated figures such that the 
globe has been divided into simply ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries. But, by 
considering more disaggregated regions –- for example: ‘old’ (Western) Europe; eastern 
Europe (the ‘transition economies’ of the former Soviet bloc countries); the United 
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States and Canada; Japan; Asian NICs; China and other Asia; Latin America; Africa — 
this static analysis can be extended to explore the dynamics and patterns of capital’s 
flows within and between blocs, in such a way as to compare FDI and trade estimates in 
terms of both dollars and labour commanded.  
Third and finally, we can gain further insights by more directly investigating the 
determinants of labour commanded FDI. As suggested above, these include the general 
conditions of reproduction of labour-power such as literacy, health, education, as well 
the existence or likelihood of social conflict, which can be proxied by rates of 
unionisation, figures on industrial disputes and so on.20 The aim here would be to model 
patterns of labour commanded FDI flows in terms of general conditions of the 
reproduction of labour power and of social conflict or harmony. 
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Appendix: Methodology, Data Sources and Estimation 
Foreign direct investment.  
All figures are drawn from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) Foreign Direct Investment database (available on-line at 
http://www.unctad.org), which reports annual FDI inflows in US dollars. 
Hourly labour costs.  
We draw on three data sources: the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics (USBLS), 
the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the United Nations (UN).  
The US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) publishes data on hourly labour compensation 
costs and hourly direct pay for production workers in manufacturing in 30 selected 
countries, compiled as part of its Foreign Labor Statistics programme 
(http://www.bls.gov/fls/home.htm). Data is available for the period 1975–2002 and is 
published both in local currencies and the US dollar equivalent, which we employ. The 
30 countries include all 20 developed countries, plus Brazil, Hong Kong, Korea, 
Mexico, Singapore, Sri Lanka and Taiwan of our developing countries. The BLS’s 
compensation measures include all items of labour compensation, including: employer 
social insurance expenditures and other labour taxes; overtime pay, shift differentials, 
other premiums and bonuses, and cost-of-living adjustments; holiday pay; the cost of 
benefits in kind; employer legally-required expenditures on retirement and disability 
pensions, health and other insurance schemes, and family allowances. The BLS argues 
their figures ‘are appropriate measures for comparing levels of employer labor costs’. 
These figures are thus suitable for our purposes, too.  
 21 
The International Labour Organization (ILO) also compiles data on manufacturing 
labour cost/employee compensation and wages, published on its on-line Laborsta 
database (http://laborsta.ilo.org). Although the technical definitions of labour cost and 
employee compensation differ slightly, the two measures are closely related and we do 
not distinguish between them. Both concepts also share many common elements with 
the USBLS’s labour-compensation measure. The principal difference between the ILO 
and BLS measures is that the former includes costs of recruitment, employee training 
and plant facilities and services, such as cafeterias and medical services. According to 
the BLS, these ‘account for no more than 4 percent of total labor costs in any country 
for which the data are available’. Substantially complete (over the period 1970–2002) 
ILO labour cost series are available for seven developed and six developing countries, 
whilst partial series are available for a further three developed and two developing 
countries.  
The ILO wage or earnings measure includes employee remuneration in cash and in 
kind, both for time worked and for time not worked such as annual vacations or other 
paid leave or holidays. The measure also includes bonus payments and family and 
housing allowances; it does not include employer contributions so social security and 
pension schemes or the benefits received by employees under such schemes. 
Substantially complete ILO wage series are available for all but seven of the 40 
counties.  
Both ILO measures — labour cost/employee compensation and wages/earnings — vary 
in their reporting unit: per hour, per day, per month or per year. Where the measure is 
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not reported on an hourly basis, we draw on ILO hours of work data in order to compute 
hourly measures. 
Finally, the United Nations publishes wages/earnings data, adopting similar definitions 
to the ILO (United Nations, Statistics Yearbook, New York: United Nations, various 
years). Substantially complete wages series are available for 22 of our 40 countries. 
Again where these figures are not provided on an hourly basis, we adjust them using 
both ILO and UN data on working hours. 
The two labour cost series — compiled by the USBLS and the ILO — are clearly most 
appropriate for our purposes, but are incomplete. We employ missing variable analysis 
in order to complete these series.21 Finally, we take the two series’ mean. 
In order to investigate the reliability of earnings series in predicting labour cost, we 
calculate various ratios of the latter to the former. In three out of four possible ratios we 
find that it is significantly higher for developed countries than for developing. This is to 
be expected, since we would expect developed countries to have more generous systems 
of social security, more stringent health and safety legislation and so on. But since the 
labour costs series are more complete for developed countries, our estimates of these 
figures for developing countries are likely to be biased upwards. As a consequence we 
will under-estimate labour-commanded for this group of countries 
Exchange rates. Data are drawn from the International Monetary Fund’s International 
Financial Statistics database (http://ifs.apdi.net/imf/).  
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Footnotes 
                                                 
1
 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Association for Heterodox 
Economics’ Annual Conference, University of Leeds, 16–18 July 2004, and we are 
grateful for other participants’ comments. We are also grateful for Paul Dunne’s useful 
suggestions. The usual caveat applies. 
2
 We are of course aware that many economists, mostly working outside the 
mainstream, do refuse to consider the ‘economic’, the ‘social’, and the ‘political’ as 
independent spheres and instead regard them as interrelated. Yet, in our approach we 
are prone to reject this distinction altogether. For us the understanding of money as 
labour commanded that we develop in the paper, implies that the three “spheres” are 
simply three analytical determinations of one immanent social relation. We are trying to 
attract attention to this social relation. 
3
 Although the category of labour commanded as discussed within the classical political 
economy tradition can offer interesting insights when compared to Keynes use of wage-
units in his General Theory, this comparison is beyond the scope of this section. For an 
interesting case of such a comparative analysis see Amado (2003). 
4
 Some of the recent discussion of the category of labour commanded include for 
example Naldi (2003), Screpanti (2003), and Glyn (2006).  
5
 The value of women’s unwaged work was recently estimated to be US$11 trillion per 
annum (United Nations: 1995). 
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6
 The tendency to ignore questions of reproduction and its relationship with production 
is one of the other problems with purely economic approaches to globalisation. If 
globalisation is viewed solely as a question of integration of different economies, that is, 
the monetised set of human activities which produce commodities, then we ignore the 
crucial set of questions concerning the integration of reproductive activities, which 
include large chunks of unwaged labour. This problem is thus closely linked to the 
problem of measure. 
7
 Of course, whether such labour is actually set in motion is also an interesting question. 
The answer will depend both upon the ‘quality’ of the labour-power (its skill levels, 
degree of subordination and so on), upon market conditions, and ultimately, upon power 
relations. 
8
 For a general discussion of the link between waged production and unwaged reproduction within the 
context of current global dynamics of production, see De Angelis (2007). 
9
 Data are obtained from the United Nations, the International Labour Organisation, the 
United States Bureau of Labor Statistics and the International Monetary Fund. For more 
details of these sources and the methodology used to estimate labour costs, see the 
Appendix. 
10
 Clearly, such definitions are historically contingent. For example, Mexico was 
admitted to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development in 1994, 
whilst in international trade statistics the Southern African Customs Union is treated as 
a developed region. For our purposes, we define both Mexico and South Africa as 
‘developing’.  
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11
 Prior to 2002 the UNCTAD reports only aggregate figures for Belgium and 
Luxembourg. We therefore treat Belgium-Luxembourg as a single country. 
12
 Note that the vertical-axis scale is logarithmic. 
13
 Our figure 1 resembles very closely Hirst and Thompson’s figure 3.2, though their 
series end in 1995 (Hirst and Thompson 1999: 71). 
14Again, the scale of the vertical-axis is logarithmic. 
15
 See the Appendix for more details. 
16
 The appropriate factor is not constant over the period. In fact, for some years, it 
would be near to 100 per cent.  
17
 This is not to say that this question is unimportant. It makes a great deal of difference 
to the citizens of a host country whether foreign capital invests in a labour-intensive 
garment factory in an export-processing zone, say, or a fleet of high-tech trawlers 
employing relatively few fishermen. Similarly, it matters whether this capital is used to 
set-up new facility or simply assumes ownership of existing plant. But our argument 
concerns the metric used to assess the degree to which states are integrated into the 
global capitalist economy, rather than the specifics of how capital exploits workers in a 
particular state. 
18
 The Sardar Sarovar Project, the largest single dam in the Narmada Valley 
Development Project, was only able to start through a World Bank loan of $450 million. 
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Following international pressure and an independent review, however, the Bank was 
forced to withdraw its support of the project. See Caufield (1998: chapter 1). 
19
 Adopting a slightly different, though complementary, theoretical framework, we 
might use labour costs figures, in conjunction with estimates of the organic composition 
of capital (the capital-labour ratio), to obtain estimates of labour-embodied or labour 
values. 
20
 See Weisskopft, et al.’s (1983) ‘social model’, which uses such variables to better 
explain post-war U.S. productivity growth. 
21
 We use the package in SPSS, choosing the expectation-maximisation method. The 
algorithm uses information on the relationships between the respective variables — the 
five earnings or labour cost series, plus the year — where observations are available, in 
order to compute the most likely values for years or countries where they are not.  
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Figure 1. Annual FDI inflows. 
Source: UNCTAD. 
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Figure 2. Total FDI (in constant prices) inflows to 20 developed and 20 developing 
countries 
Source: UNCTAD. 
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Figure 3. Annual FDI inflows and labour commanded for 20 developed and 20 
developing countries. 
Source: various, see text. 
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Figure 4. Total FDI labour commanded inflows to 20 developed and 20 developing 
countries 
Source: various, see text 
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